If we move in, we have to stay committed

Last Thursday, a solemn ceremony was held in Basra to mark the end of Britain's military mission to Iraq. The Government's public relations machine was well prepared, as you might expect, having flown dozens of journalists into the city. Our television screens were full of sturdy-looking soldiers and smiling Iraqi children. Minister of Defence John Hutton was in little doubt about the outcome of the six-year operation: "When the history is written of this campaign, they will say of the British military: 'We did a superb job.'"

Mr Hutton is certainly right to ponder how history will judge British actions in Basra, but this issue is far too important to be left to the government spin-doctors who were hard at work all last week. The invasion of Iraq was the high point of the "liberal interventionism" that dominated the Bush and Blair years; sending troops overseas with the promise of delivering democracy, prosperity and stability to the far-flung corners of the globe. As British troops leave Basra, however, it is not only the judgement of history that is at stake. The legacy of this foreign policy adventurism remains. British and American forces are withdrawing from Iraq so that more troops can be sent to Afghanistan. For there to be any chance of success in Kabul, the results of British policy in Basra requires intense scrutiny.

As the flag was lowered in Basra and journalists toured the city, the Ministry of Defence in London was keen to draw attention to its modest achievements. However, as hard as you look you will not find Mr Hutton or his ministry explaining its relations with one former resident of Basra, Ahmed al-Fartusi. But it is the Government's dealings with Mr Fartusi that go a long way to explain why history will judge Britain's six years in Basra as a failure.

Ahmed al-Fartusi was a senior commander in the Mahdi army, a radical militia with 17,000 fighters in Basra. Before the British took over the city in April 2003, the Mahdi army did not exist. The British Government underestimated the number of troops needed to control this city of 1.6 million people. As a result, Basra descended into lawless anarchy with militias and criminal gangs fighting over the spoils of oil smuggling. The Mahdi army emerged from this chaos to become the strongest force in the city, infiltrating the police force and terrorising the population. In 2007, it had turned its attention to the British army itself, killing 44 soldiers in an attempt to force them from the city.

As the death toll of British troops rose, politicians in London scrabbled for an exit strategy that could end their commitment to the hugely unpopular war. This is where Mr Fartusi came in. By 2007, he was a prisoner in the British airbase just outside Basra. He offered the British Government a deal: if he was released along with 120 of his comrades then the Mahdi army would allow British troops to redeploy, leaving Basra city without having to endure a fighting retreat. However, once they got to the airbase they had to promise not to return to the city, leaving the Mahdi army free to impose its will on the population. Whitehall seized on this deal, handing Basra over to the militias. The resulting violence and criminality go so bad that Iraq's Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki was forced in March last year to send 20,000 troops from Baghdad to retake Basra and drive the Mahdi army off the streets.

The lessons from the debacle of invading Iraq are disturbing. Firstly, Tony Blair committed his Government to rebuilding a country he knew almost nothing about. In 2003, Blair's breezy arrogance replaced any sustained assessment of what was needed to create the democracy and prosperity he so glibly promised the Iraqi people. The commitments given on the eve of invasion were rapidly jettisoned when the political costs of meeting them became too great. Secondly, it became quickly apparent that the British Army did not have the troop numbers needed to protect the people of Basra. The 40,000 British troops used to invade were quickly reduced to 9,000 and then to 4,000 before being totally withdrawn on Thursday. The lack of troops on the ground and political backing in London finally forced British commanders in 2007 to abdicate any responsibility for the city.

When faced with the enormous costs of the promises made, the British Government found it easier to indulge in spin than acknowledge responsibility for the perilous state of the city. As John Hutton's words last week indicate, that spin is still going on. It is this mixture of arrogance, political expediency and mendacity that led to the deal with Ahmed al-Fartusi and the handing of Basra over to the militias. It has resulted in the tragic deaths of 179 British service personnel and an estimated 3,302 to 3,766 Iraqis.

Britain's task in Afghanistan is, if anything, even greater than the one faced in Iraq. The state in Afghanistan has to be built from scratch along with its army and police force. The Taliban have proved to be a much more formidable fighting force than the Mahdi army ever was. The British Government needs to be very modest in the commitments it makes. Instead of indulging in spin, as it did in Basra, the Government needs to be explicit with the British public, explaining what it has embarked upon, the length of time and resources that will be required and what its expectations for Afghanistan are. Modesty and honesty are the painful lessons that need to be learnt from Basra.